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Against the apparent casting away of poetry from contemporary phi-
losophy of language and aesthetics which has left poetry forceless, I ar-
gue that poetry has a linguistic, philosophical, and even political force. 
Against the idea that literature (as novel) can teach us facts about the 
world, I argue that the force of literature (as poetry) resides in its capac-
ity to change our ways of seeing. First, I contest views which consider po-
etry forceless by discussing Austin’s and Sartre’s views. Second, I explore 
the concept of force in the realm of art—focusing on Nietzsche’s philoso-
phy and Menke’s Kraft der Kunst—and the relations between linguistic, 
artistic, and political forces. Third, I consider how the transformative 
force of poetry can be considered political by turning to Kristeva’s Revo-
lution in Poetic Language and Meschonnic’s conception of poetry accord-
ing to which the poem does something to language and the subject. To 
illustrate this transformative force of poetry, I analyse Caroline Zekri’s 
poem ‘Un pur rapport grammatical’. I therefore think of poetry not only 
as doing something with language, but also as doing something to lan-
guage. To rephrase Austin’s famous t itle, and thus reverse his evaluation 
of poetry, poetry might reveal us not only How to Do Things with Words, 
but how to do things to words and, through this doing, how to transform 
and affect the world.
Keywords: Philosophy of poetry; ordinary language philosophy; 
force.
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Je suis donc obligé de dire que le poème fait quelque chose. Il 
fait quelque chose au langage, et à la poésie. Il fait quelque 
chose au sujet. Au sujet qui le compose, au sujet qui le lit.
(Meschonnic 2001: 43)1
Despite its attempt to systematically analyse the specifi cities of each 
artform, contemporary aesthetics seems to have surprisingly left po-
etry aside. From being the paragon of the arts in 18th and 19th century 
philosophy—as in Baumgarten, Kant, or Hegel for instance—poetry in 
the contemporary world seems to have lost most, if not all, of its philo-
sophical force. Even Plato, who is famous for being rather unkind to 
poetry, nevertheless admits that poetry has a specifi c force, one he is 
afraid of, and his unkindness reveals his fear of poetry rather than an 
indifference towards it. In contemporary aesthetics, as John Gibson 
argues, ‘until very recently one could fairly say that poetry is the last 
great unexplored frontier in contemporary analytic aesthetics, an an-
cient and central art we have managed to overlook more or less entirely’ 
(Gibson 2015: 1). Even though one might argue that the situation has 
changed since then and that Gibson overlooks some traditions in phi-
losophy’s dealing with poetry, it seems that poetry has lately received 
less attention than fi lm or the novel for instance. How can one explain 
such a change of attitude towards poetry? One of the main reasons for 
this shift can be found in one of the grounds of analytic philosophy: the 
linguistic turn’. If, following this turn, philosophy is a matter of lan-
guage and solving philosophical problems becomes a matter of solving 
linguistic ones, poetry seems to be of no help at all, quite to the contra-
ry, to philosophy of language either as ‘ideal language philosophy’ or as 
‘ordinary language philosophy’, the two types of philosophy of language 
Rorty considers in editing The Linguistic Turn (Rorty 1967: 15). If po-
etry is a problem for the former, as it presents a form of language which 
cannot be translated into formal logic and therefore not be given any 
truth-value, the latter also shows no interest in it, as Austin suggests 
that performative utterances in a poem, are ‘in a peculiar way hollow or 
void’ (Austin 1975: 22). Failure for philosophy of language to give a sub-
stantial account of the language of poetry might have contaminated the 
realm of aesthetics and incited philosophers to look at artforms other 
than poetry, more easily approachable with these new philosophical 
tools.2 The great interest in literature (here understood as the novel) 
1 My translation: ‘I am therefore forced to say that the poem does something. It 
does something to language and to poetry. It does something to the subject. To the 
subject that composes it, to the subject that reads it.’ 
2 It must be said that most philosophies of language have attempted to give 
an account of poetic phenomena but have often considered poetic language from 
the sole perspective of metaphor. Metaphor has been of importance throughout 
the whole history of philosophy of language, but inasmuch as metaphor is only one 
poetic phenomenon among many others, these accounts of poetic language do not 
exhaust the possibilities used in poetry. It is worth noting that metaphors pervade 
our everyday speech (Lakoff and Johnson 2003) and can therefore not really be 
considered a defi nitory feature of poetic language. This idea that metaphor is central 
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and the problem of truth in fi ction can be seen as a consequence of 
the ‘linguistic turn’: philosophers have started looking into aesthetic 
problems for which philosophy of language could be of use, rather than 
artforms which are problematic to philosophy of language.3 Inasmuch 
as Austin deprives poetry from any performative force, contemporary 
aesthetics strips poetry from its philosophical force.
If this account gives a schematic picture of the place of poetry in 
analytic aesthetics, one might think poetry fares better on the other 
side of the so-called ‘analytic-continental divide.’ At fi rst glance, conti-
nental philosophers seem to pursue the 19th century praise of poetry.4 
Heidegger for instance considers poetry almost on par with philosophy, 
and the most philosophical of all artforms. If one looks further, howev-
er, a shift in attitude similar to that of analytic aesthetics seems to oc-
cur in continental philosophy. Although it is not a mark of indifference 
towards poetry, Sartre’s theory of literature seems to operate a similar 
shift from poetry to literature (and one can understand here, as with 
analytic philosophy, ‘the novel’). Indeed, Sartre defi nes literature in 
terms of political commitment and denies any commitment to poetry.5 
Very schematically: if the force of literature is proportional to its politi-
cal commitment, poetry has no force as it is denied such commitment. 
This does not mean that Sartre denies any greatness to poetry but as-
cribes it one which might be of another kind, one which is certainly not 
of help to any concern in the actual world. If poetry still has a force in 
continental aesthetics, it is not a political one, not a force of infl uence in 
to poetry (and it is in some cases) shows a focus on 19th century poetry rather than on 
contemporary forms. If a philosophy of poetry is to give an account of current poetic 
practices as well, metaphor might not be of great help.
3 Contemporary philosophy of literature indeed shows little interest in poetry, 
perhaps because the notion of fi ction which is central to studies in literature does 
not apply to poetry, or not in a straightforward way. One could even say that poetry 
undermines the fi ction/nonfi ction divide. Contemporary autofi ctions also work 
towards this undermining, but as for poetry, philosophy of literature seems to be 
exclusively focused on the 19th century novel, as Peter Lamarque argues: ‘Philosophy 
of Literature has virtually become Philosophy of the Novel’ (Lamarque 2017: 109).
4 It seems indeed that all continental philosophers bring their attention to poetry 
in some way or another. However, this (sometimes) central place they give to poetry 
further attempts to isolate it from the ordinary world, to leave it in its ivory tower.
5 Maximilian de Gaynesford offers an interesting reading of Austin in relation 
to the notion of commitment (although not necessarily political commitment), which 
opens a potential link between Austin and Sartre. According to him, either poetry is 
capable of commitment and is thus serious, or it is not and can therefore not claim 
to seriousness: ‘For if we insist that poetry is “serious”, Austin can still rescue his 
approach to speech acts; he must simply accept that commitment-apt utterances 
in poetry may make commitments. And it is surely possible to contemplate ways 
of integrating poetry and philosophy while acknowledging that poetry is, indeed, 
serious. (The surprise is that we might have been able to do so without acknow-
ledging this.) We would, however, have to renounce the attempt to exempt poetry 
from forms of commitment’ (de Gaynesford 2011: 49). We then must choose whether 
we would rather commit poetry to seriousness and hence abandon the idea of poetic 
license or abandon commitment in favour of poetic license.
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the everyday world, but rather a force of distancing and isolating itself 
from the commonplace.
One of the possible reasons for this shift is an inversion of value 
between literature and poetry. Whereas poetry was literature (or the 
highest literary form) for 18th and 19th century philosophers (and in this 
sense Heidegger inherits from this background and pursues a romantic 
tradition), the 20th century marks the rise of the novel in philosophical 
concerns. When one thinks of literature nowadays, the fi rst thing to 
come to mind is probably more often a novel than a poem. In that sense, 
philosophy of poetry would be considered a subcategory of philosophy of 
literature rather than the opposite.6 However, even if there were such 
a shift, it would not explain the disdain towards poetry and why phi-
losophers have stripped it from its force. In my paper, I therefore aim 
at reinstating the force of poetry by showing that it has a linguistic, 
philosophical, and even political force (and this as much as the novel) 
because poetry, I will argue, has a revolutionary dimension. Against 
the idea that literature (as novel) can teach us facts about the world, 
I argue that literature (as poetry) teaches us a different way of seeing 
the world and that its force resides precisely in its capacity to bring us 
(or force us, perhaps) to see things differently. As Wittgenstein puts 
it: ‘The work of art compels us to see it in the right perspective’ (Witt-
genstein 1998: 7) More than seeing the work of art itself in the right 
perspective, it compels us to see the world in the right perspective, in a 
perspective which makes sense.
To explore the force(s) of poetry, my paper is divided in three parts. 
First, I contest views which consider poetry forceless, be it linguisti-
cally or politically, by discussing Austin’s and Sartre’s views. Second, I 
explore the concept of force in the realm of art—focusing on Nietzsche’s 
philosophy and Menke’s Kraft der Kunst—and the relations between 
linguistic, artistic, and political forces. Third, I explore how the trans-
formative force of poetry can be considered political by turning to Kris-
teva’s Revolution in Poetic Language and Meschonnic’s conception of 
poetry according to which the poem does something to language and to 
the subject. To illustrate this transformative—and even political—force 
of poetry, I offer an analysis of Caroline Zekri’s poem ‘Un pur rapport 
grammatical’. Poetry is revolutionary in the sense that it brings to see 
language and the world anew. Poetry is not only doing something with 
6 Peter Lamarque for instance considers philosophy of poetry to be a sub-branch 
of philosophy of literature: ‘But just when aestheticians are getting used to another 
recent sub-division, The Philosophy of Literature, here comes a sub-branch of that, 
focused on poetry’ (Lamarque 2017: 109). We could argue against Lamarque that 
philosophy of literature is not so recent (and perhaps one of the oldest forms of 
philosophy of art if we think of Aristotle) and that philosophy of poetry, historically 
speaking, comes fi rst. However, I agree with Lamarque to a certain extent in 
considering philosophy of poetry distinct from philosophy of literature. My only 
contention is that philosophy of poetry must be understood as radically different 
from philosophy of literature rather than as a sub-branch of it.
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language, but also doing something to language. To rephrase Austin’s 
famous title, and thus reverse his evaluation of poetry, poetry might 
not reveal us How to Do Things with Words, but how to do things to 
words. The force of poetry is not primarily political, but it becomes po-
litical insofar as its force modifi es language and, through this modifi ca-
tion of language, our ways of being in the world.
1. The forcelessness of poetry: Austin and Sartre
This fi rst section explores two ways in which poetry is considered 
forceless, respectively from a linguistic and a political perspective. As 
outlined in the introduction, Austin considers poetic statements to be 
without performative force and Sartre poems to lack political commit-
ment. Although the authors are quite distant from one another, these 
two considerations are not unrelated as Sartre’s argument against the 
political force of poetry relies on depriving poetry from any linguistic 
force.
In How to Do Things with Words, Austin distinguishes between con-
stative utterances, statements of fact, and performative utterances ‘in 
which by saying or in saying something we are doing something’ (Aus-
tin 1975: 12). In other words, and following Austin’s example, saying 
‘I promise’ is not a statement of fact but a performance of the act of 
promising, as much as saying ‘I do’ in a marriage ceremony is a per-
formance of the act of marrying. ‘Here we should say that in saying 
these words we are doing something—namely, marrying, rather than 
reporting something, namely that we are marrying’ (Austin 1975: 13). 
There is a distinction between speech acts that describe or report a fact 
and speech acts that perform an action, although both kinds of utter-
ances might look alike. Performative utterances might grammatically 
look like statements, but they are different from them in that they can-
not be said to be true or false; they have no truth-value, but they have 
a certain force.
At fi rst glance, replacing the notion of truth-value by that of force 
might open the possibility to account for uses of language which escape 
the game of truth-value, such as poetic and literary uses. Indeed, in the 
framework of conceptions of language based on truth-value, poetic and 
literary uses are problematic, insofar as they must be said to be false.7 
Although they are false, they might not be forceless, and the notion of 
force could serve here to reinstate such uses within the theory and phi-
losophy of language. Unfortunately, Austin does not make this move 
but follows the tradition in excluding such uses from his consideration.
To substitute to the notion of truth-value, Austin calls on the term 
7 Among other things, it is this incapacity for conception of language to account 
for literary statements that brought to the fore the notion of fi ction, from Russell’s 
bald king of France to Walton’s focus on make-believe. The problem of fi ction has 
gained crucial signifi cance in the contemporary philosophical landscape, but poetry 
seems to place a limit to the notion of fi ction as it blurs the fi ction/nonfi ction divide.
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felicity. However, in describing felicitous and infelicitous performative 
utterances, he specifi es that some utterances do not take part in this 
game of felicity. Those utterances are ‘non-serious’ uses of language:
Secondly, as utterances our performatives are also heir to certain other 
kinds of ill which infect all utterances. And these likewise, though again 
they might be brought into a more general account, we are deliberately at 
present excluding. I mean, for example, the following: a performative utter-
ance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor 
on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies 
in a similar manner to any and every utterance—a sea-change in special 
circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways—intelli-
gibly—used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use—ways 
which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language. All this we are 
excluding from consideration. Our performative utterances, felicitous or 
not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances. (Austin 1975: 
21–22)
From the outset, Austin considers poetic utterances ‘hollow or void’. 
This view is not new to philosophy of language and refl ects the tradi-
tional rejection of poetic uses as deviant uses. It is rather common in 
theorising language to distinguish between ordinary and poetic uses, 
the latter being deviances from the former. However, such a view fails 
to acknowledge the fact that ‘deviant’ uses might become ordinary. So-
called ‘dead’ metaphors are an example of such bringing non-ordinary 
uses in ordinary language. More widely, everyday language is full of 
creative uses of language which outgrow so-called ordinary uses. By 
excluding poetic utterances from his conception of language, Austin 
limits its scope and makes a metaphysical move.8
Further in How to Do Things with Words, Austin makes a second 
distinction between ‘the locutionary act (and within it the phonetic, the 
phatic, and the rhetic acts) which has meaning; the illocutionary act 
which has a certain force in saying something; the perlocutionary act 
8 The charge of making a metaphysical move is one Derrida raises against Austin 
in his article ‘Signature, Event, Context’ which gave rise to the famous debate with 
Searle. Searle’s defence of Austin argues that the parasitic-ordinary distinction is 
not metaphysical but strategic. However, this defence misses Derrida’s point which 
is precisely to say that if one posits a difference (be it only strategically), one commits 
to a system of metaphysical dualisms and its related hierarchies. Distinguishing 
from the outset ordinary from parasitic uses might be only strategic but it does 
not remain at this level. As soon as the distinction is posited, values are attributed 
to both terms of the dualism (traditionally, ordinary is good, parasitic bad). The 
whole idea of deconstruction is to undercut this system of metaphysical dualism by 
showing the fl uidity of terms and values. Derrida’s aim is therefore not to promote 
parasitic uses over ordinary ones, as this promotion would reaffi rm the dualism, but 
to undercut it and consider the distinction impossible: for Derrida, one can never 
say whether a statement is ordinary or parasitic for those attributes can only be 
given within the game of metaphysical dualisms. Without entering in detail here, 
Derrida’s view of Austin is in my opinion much more positive than what Searle’s 
reply suggests: I believe Derrida considers Austin’s theory as potentially germane 
but raises a reserve regarding the distinction he makes between ordinary and 
parasitic uses.
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which is the achieving of certain effects by saying something’ (Austin 
1975: 121). As Austin mentions it, the distinction between illocution-
ary acts and perlocutionary acts ‘seems the likeliest to give trouble’ 
(Austin 1975: 110). In order to distinguish them, Austin shows that the 
illocutionary force is not a consequence of the locutionary act (in the 
sense of a physical consequence), but a convention. The illocutionary 
act might have an effect, but this effect is due to the conventions that 
regulate the use of language. The perlocutionary act is on the contrary 
not conventional as the use of language aims at certain effects without 
having those inscribed in a convention.
In this context, poetic utterances are considered ‘hollow or void’ 
from any illocutionary force, insofar as such utterances are not conven-
tional. As Joe Friggieri argues, there is a ‘suspension of illocutionary 
force’ (Friggieri 2014: 58) in poetic utterances. However, two problems 
arise from such a conception: fi rst, is this suspension always clearly 
stated and understandable? Most misunderstandings in ordinary 
speech might come from a misinterpretation of the status of the speech 
act. Second, is it possible to always distinguish an ordinary from an ex-
traordinary use of language? Without entering into the details of Der-
rida’s discussion of Austin, Austin’s requirement for a ‘total context’ 
in order to distinguish ordinary from extraordinary uses is something 
Derrida considers impossible. Indeed, Austin considers that performa-
tive utterances, unlike statements, can be understood only by calling 
on ‘the total situation in which the utterance is issued’ (Austin 1975: 
52). Is this situation fully determinable? Derrida argues against Austin 
by saying that the context is never completely determined, and that 
Austin’s requirement is thus impossible to meet. If the context can nev-
er be determined as ordinary with complete certainty, it is impossible 
to distinguish ordinary from parasitic uses (Derrida 1988: 14).
In his various works, Stanley Cavell attempts to take poetry seri-
ously in order, among other aims, to save Austin from Derrida’s criti-
cism. In A Pitch of Philosophy, he shows that the Derrida-Searle de-
bate is the product of a mutual misunderstanding which has caused 
more trouble to philosophy than needed. Searle’s criticism of Derrida 
indeed misses the point that Derrida sees something valuable in Aus-
tin, whereas Derrida puts too much focus on Austin’s rejection of po-
etic language, which should not, according to Cavell, be interpreted as 
a rejection.9 Cavell considers Austin’s ordinary to be an opposition to 
both the metaphysical and the formal, not to the poetic or the literary. 
As he argues: ‘That in literary studies Austin’s ordinary language is 
instead thought to be contrasted with literary language means to me 
that Austin has not there been received’ (Cavell 1994: 62). One way of 
receiving Austin in literary studies would therefore be to set aside the 
9 Recent scholarship has given much attention to the Derrida-Searle debate, as it 
marks an important moment in the history of the analytic-continental divide, see for 
instance Raoul Moati’s and Jesus Navarro’s book-length explorations of the debate 
(Navarro 2017; Moati 2014).
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ordinary/literary distinction. Stanley Fish suggests such a reading of 
ordinary language: ‘What philosophical semantics and the philosophy 
of speech acts are telling us is that ordinary language is extraordinary 
because at its heart is precisely that realm of values, intentions, and 
purposes which is often assumed to be the exclusive property of lit-
erature’ (Fish 1982: 108). Following Cavell’s and Fish’s leads, recent 
trends in ordinary language philosophy have made of literature an 
important aspect of their investigation of language.10 To that extent, 
Austin’s project might be closer to Derrida than one initially thinks. 
According to Cavell, Derrida is wrong to consider Austin to be reject-
ing poetic language, as he argues that in fact Austin’s theory can be 
of use for literary studies. In some sense, Cavell’s whole philosophy is 
an attempt to take literature seriously from within the framework of 
ordinary language philosophy.11
We have seen that by depriving poetry from any performative and 
illocutionary force, Austin strips poetic language from any impact on 
the ordinary world. By placing such uses on a stage, far away from 
ordinary uses, he isolates poetry from ordinary language. In such a 
view, the value of poetry would only lie in an abstract and vain play 
on and with language: abstract because unrelated to any social and 
practical reality, vain because unable to affect the socio-political world. 
The forcelessness of poetry in language entails a forcelessness in the 
everyday world. Austin is not the only philosopher to put poetry in 
such a remote place, Sartre suggests something similar, following the 
acknowledgment that poetic language is remote from the ordinary.
Sartre argues that if a poetic utterance has no force, illocutionary 
and performative, it cannot have any political impact. He asks: ‘How 
can one hope to provoke the indignation or the political enthusiasm 
of the reader when the very thing one does is to withdraw him from 
the human condition and invite him to consider with the eyes of God a 
language that has been turned inside out?’ (Sartre 1988: 34). To place 
poetic language apart from ordinary language is to place poetry in no 
position to infl uence the everyday politicised world. This separation 
might seem surprising as, in What Is Writing?, Sartre defi nes litera-
ture in terms of political commitment, in terms of the effects literature 
can have in a political framework. This defi nition however concerns 
10 See Toril Moi’s latest book, which questions the distinction between ordinary 
and literary language from within the framework of ordinary language philosophy: 
‘Ordinary language is certainly not the opposite of ‘literary’ language. (In my view, 
there is no such thing as ‘literary language.’) Nor is ordinary language the opposite 
of ‘extraordinary language.’ The extraordinary is at home in the ordinary. (We 
share perfectly ordinary criteria for when to apply the concept.) There is nothing 
extraordinary about the extraordinary’ (Moi 2017: 162). See also Maximilian de 
Gaynesford’s work on Austin and poetry (de Gaynesford 2011; 2009).
11 On that topic, Cavell’s concluding question in The Claim of Reason reveals the 
central role of literature for philosophy: ‘Can philosophy become literature and still 
know itself?’ (Cavell 1979: 496).
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only literature (and here more specifi cally the novel) and not poetry. 
Indeed, Sartre uses this defi nition to distinguish literature from other 
artforms: ‘No, we do not want to “commit” painting, sculpture, and mu-
sic “too,” or at least not in the same way’ (Sartre 1988: 25). Poetry is an 
artform different from literature and therefore an artform whose main 
characteristic is not to be politically committed. The defi nition of poetry 
in terms of ‘language that has been turned inside out’ prevents poetry 
from having any political infl uence. For Sartre—as for Austin—poetry 
uses a language which steps outside the bounds of ordinary language, 
that is outside the bounds of a language that can infl uence the ordinary 
world.
In order to defi ne literature in political terms, Sartre considers it to 
be a means for action:
Thus, the prose-writer is a man who has chosen a certain method of second-
ary action which we may call action by disclosure. It is therefore permissible 
to ask him this second question: ‘What aspect of the world do you want to 
disclose? What change do you want to bring into the world by this disclo-
sure?’ The ‘committed’ writer knows that words are action. He knows that to 
reveal is to change and that one can reveal only by planning to change. He 
has given up the impossible dream of giving an impartial picture of Society 
and the human condition. (Sartre 1988: 37)
If the language of poetry is remote from the everyday world, if it is as 
Sartre says a God’s eye’s view, literature is on the contrary rooted in 
the everyday world. The prose-writer uses language to infl uence the 
course of the world, to disclose something of the world and hence to 
change it. Words are action, words perform. For poets, however, lan-
guage is something else: ‘Poets are men who refuse to utilize language.’ 
(Sartre 1988, 29) Sartre’s defi nitions of poet and prose-writer however 
seem to rely on a contradiction. Indeed, is the poet not someone who 
‘has given up the impossible dream of giving an impartial picture of 
Society and the human condition’ as well? For Sartre, the poet ‘with-
draw the reader from the human condition and invite him to consider 
with the eyes of God a language that has been turned inside out,’ but 
does such a conception suggest that poetry has no effect, neither on the 
human condition, nor on language itself? If the poet is someone who 
changes language—who ‘turns it inside out’—by using it (in opposition 
to maintaining language by utilising it), she might be someone who af-
fects the human condition in greater ways than the prose-writer.
As long as we remain within the Austinian (and the philosopher of 
language) framework in which poetic statements are considered force-
less, there is no way for the poet to affect the ordinary world. However, 
if we turn the Austinian distinction around and consider poetry force-
ful, the poet is then she who affects the human condition the most, 
insofar as she affects how language can be used. How can we turn this 
distinction around? The distinction Sartre suggests between prose-
writers and poets as well as the distinction Austin establishes between 
ordinary and parasitic speech acts both rely on a conception of lan-
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guage which postulate from the outset this distinction. It is by revalu-
ating the conception of language without falling into the prejudice of 
the dualism between ordinary and extraordinary that we can give its 
force back to poetry.
2. Nietzsche, Menke, and the notion of force
If taking linguistic force away from poetry entails a political forceless-
ness, reinstating force in the language of poetry might make it relevant 
again for social and political concerns. The fi rst step in giving poetry its 
force back is therefore to give it a linguistic force. Nietzsche’s views on 
language offer useful insights in how force operates within language, 
and therefore how force can operate within poetic language (if there is 
even such a distinction between ordinary and poetic language). Clau-
dia Crawford’s reading of Nietzsche’s theory of language provides an 
ideal starting point to explore the notion of force in Nietzsche’s views 
on language:
In the works of his last year another phase in Nietzsche’s understanding of 
language is intensifi ed and provides the material for a specifi c study. Lan-
guage retains its effectiveness as force and play of forces, but now Nietzsche 
begins to lay more stress on the power which each individual instance of 
language production exerts as an instance of value and action. […] Lan-
guage becomes a dynamic instance of interpretation and valuing, not in a 
critical sense of a subject who interprets values and then speaks or writes 
about those interpretations, but in a creative sense where the speaking or 
writing itself is the new value force embodied. (Crawford 1988: xiii)
This characterisation of Nietzsche’s conception of language is Austin-
ian in the sense that language is equated with action. If each instance 
of language is ‘an instance of value and action’, each instance could be 
read as a performative. Although Austin’s initial limitation of perfor-
mativity to a certain class of verbs seems to go against this idea, his 
later characterisation of utterances as all having a force goes in this 
direction. I n this sense, Nietzsche shares Austin’s idea that all speech 
acts are performative, i.e. have a force, but does not make the serious/
non-serious distinction. For Nietzsche, all utterances are performative, 
including poetic and other non-serious ones.
This difference in their relation to poetry is the point of greatest 
dissent between Nietzsche’s and Austin’s conceptions of language. In-
deed, while they share this common concern of language as power (a 
point of contact that Derrida already suggests12), the place attributed 
to poetry is radically different. Contrary to Austin’s rejection of poetry, 
Nietzsche embraces poetic utterances by writing his philosophy in a 
12 Austin was obliged to free the analysis of the performative from the authority 
of the truth value, from the true/false opposition, at least in its classical form, and 
to substitute for it at times the value of force, of difference of force (illocutionary or 
perlocutionary force). (In this line of thought, which is nothing less than Nietzschean, 
this in particular strikes me as moving in the direction of Nietzsche himself, who often 
acknowledged a certain affi nity for a vein of English thought.) (Derrida 1988: 13).
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poetic way and even writing poems proper. His views on language, such 
as exposed in his early text On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense in 
which he considers language to be primarily metaphorical, bring to the 
fore the creative aspect of language and is at odds with Austin’s more 
descriptive stance. This creative aspect is important because creating 
language, in the sense of naming, is a mark of power for Nietzsche, 
as he suggests in On the Genealogy of Morality13: ‘the origin of lan-
guage itself [is] a manifestation of the power of the rulers.’ (GM I, 2) 
The relation between language and power lies in the fact that giving 
names, naming, is an act of power, of taking possession. Language does 
not only mirror the world in a neutral way but crafts it according to 
the will of the powerful. In GM, Nietzsche considers that the keys to 
shaping the world has been given to the rulers but, in The Gay Sci-
ence14, Nietzsche suggests that those who give names are those with 
originality: ‘Those with originality have for the most part also assigned 
names.’ (GS 261) This notion of originality brings us back to the realm 
of art and poetry. Reading this aphorism with GM in mind suggests 
that those who have power are not the rulers but the artists, those with 
force are those with originality.
As a shaping of the world, originality is a poetic force in the ety-
mological sense of poiesis. It is a making of the world, which is, at the 
same time, an unmaking, as ‘[w]e can destroy only as creators.’ (GS 
58) This process of destruction and creation is primarily linguistic, as 
Nietzsche further argues: ‘But let us not forget this either: it is enough 
to create new names and estimations and probabilities in order to cre-
ate in the long run new “things.”’ (GS 58) The force of artists, and poets 
especially as they are primarily concerned with language, lies in their 
capacity to create new words and hence new things. The linguistic force 
of originality is both a destructive and creative force which modifi es the 
world we live in.
Although the notion of force is hardly ever conceptualised as such 
in aesthetics, it is quite common to consider artworks to have a certain 
force, a certain effect. Nietzsche considers this force to be creative, and 
Christoph Menke offers a thorough exploration of the force of art in his 
book Die Kraft der Kunst. He constructs his notion of force in contrast 
to that of capacity, one being active and the other passive:
Capacity makes us subjects who successfully take part in social practices, 
insofar as they reproduce their general form. In the play of forces, we are 
pre- and over-subjective agents who are no subjects; active, without self-
consciousness; inventive, without aim.15
13 (Nietzsche 2006) Hereafter GM.
14 (Nietzsche 1974) Hereafter GS.
15 My translation: ‘Vermögen machen uns zu Subjekten, die erfolgreich an sozialen 
Praktiken teilnehmen können, indem sie deren allgemeine Form reproduzieren. Im 
Spiel der Kräfte sind wir vor- und übersubjektiv—Agenten, die keine Subjekte sind; 
aktiv, ohne Selbstbewusstsein; erfi nderisch, ohne Zweck’ (Menke 2013: 13).
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This opposition between passive capacity and active force is not with-
out reminding Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche according to which there 
are active forces and reactive forces in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Deleuze 
argues that positive forces are active, i.e. creative, whereas reactive 
forces are negative in the sense that they are always subject to a pre-
vious active force.16 Similarly, Menke considers the notion of capacity 
to make us subjects, i.e. to submit us to a social practice, whereas the 
play of forces aims at freeing us from this subjection. In the play of 
forces, we are ‘inventive without aim’ because we are creative without 
being submitted to a conventional practice. In this sense, poetry might 
indeed not work within the realm of illocutionary forces, as those are 
conventional, but within perlocutionary forces. However, as we have 
seen with Austin, the distinction between illocutionary acts and perlo-
cutionary acts ‘seems the likeliest to give trouble’ (Austin 1975: 110). 
This trouble might mean, and this is a path Nietzsche and Menke open, 
that this distinction should be abandoned.
Mo re specifi cally, it might be impossible to distinguish the illocu-
tionary from the perlocutionary. Perhaps, the perlocutionary can even 
become illocutionary in time. Although Austin does not discuss the 
ways in which the illocutionary force comes to existence (it seems to the 
contrary that for Austin this illocutionary force is either there or not, 
without any consideration about how it might appear or disappear), 
we could imagine that an unintended perlocutionary effect might, in 
time, repeat itself so regularly that it becomes a convention and thus 
an illocutionary effect rather than a perlocutionary one. A compari-
son with the theory of metaphor might enlighten this point. Indeed, it 
is common to distinguish dead metaphors from creative ones. A dead 
metaphor however is originally a creative one that has been so used 
that it does not appear as a metaphor anymore. Max Black compares 
conventional metaphorical uses such as ‘cherry lips’ to catachresis: ‘So 
viewed, metaphor is a species of catachresis, which I shall defi ne as the 
use of a word in some new sense in order to remedy a gap in the vocabu-
lary. Catachresis is the putting of new senses into old words. But if a 
catachresis serves a genuine need, the new sense introduced will quick-
ly become part of the literal sense’ (Black 1955: 280). In this sense, a 
metaphorical sense can become literal. Once a metaphor becomes con-
ventional, it loses its creative aspect. Similarly, once a perlocutionary 
16 ‘The power of transformation, the Dionysian power, is the primary defi nition 
of activity. But each time we point out the nobility of action and its superiority to 
reaction in this way we must not forget that reaction also designates a type of force. It 
is simply that reactions cannot be grasped or scientifi cally understood as forces if they 
are not related to superior forces—forces of another type. The reactive is a primordial 
quality of force but one which can only be interpreted as such in relation to and on 
the basis of the active’ (Deleuze 1983: 42). Even though Deleuze’s interpretation 
of Nietzsche in terms of active and reactive forces is somewhat problematic, the 
distinction between active and reactive forces provides an insightful framework to 
consider how active forces are transformative, how the ‘Dionysian power,’ as Deleuze 
puts it, or the power of art, can actively transform the world by transforming values.
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effect becomes conventional, it could become an illocutionary effect.
However, as conventions are always contextual and as the ‘total 
context’ of a speech act is, as Derrida argues, never fully determinable, 
these conventions are never completely determined. There is a lack of 
determinacy that appears more or less clearly in our uses of language 
(hence the possibility of misunderstanding or, in Austin’s vocabulary, 
of misfi re). It therefore seems that without this determination, the illo-
cutionary force of a speech act is diffi cultly distinguishable from its per-
locutionary force. In this sense, poetry contests the idea that the con-
text and convention on which the illocutionary force relies can always 
be determined. In other words, there are so few determined contexts 
(if there are any) that the illocutionary force would only apply to very 
few utterances. Rather than suspending the illocutionary force, poetry 
reveals that it might not be the most important force in language. The 
illocutionary force would in this sense be a subcategory of the perlocu-
tionary, without there being such a sharp distinction between them. So 
following Nietzsche and Menke, we must reassess Austin’s distinction 
between illocutionary and perlocutionary, considering all utterances to 
have a force, relying to various degrees on conventions and contextual 
cues.
It remains however to be clarifi ed what poetic speech acts do, what 
their effects are. Menke considers art to have a certain effect, to be a 
certain making which comes close to Nietzsche’s views:
What art makes is not an object of knowledge, because what art makes 
does not have its ground in knowledge. Hence philosophical aesthetics has 
called this making ‘obscure’ (Baumgarten): the aesthetic making is not a 
self-conscious activity, because there is no aesthetic making without the ac-
tion of ‘unconscious forces’ (Herder). This action is play: the connection and 
disconnection and the new connection and again disconnection of images in 
the acts of imagination.17
There is a play of forces which connects and disconnects (in Nietzsche’s 
terms: creates and destroys) images. In poetry, such images are words 
and the poets are those who connect and disconnect words, not only 
between one another, as in a sentence or spatially on the page, but 
also between language and the world, thus revealing how the world is 
made up with words. The effect of art, and more specifi cally of poetic 
speech acts, is to reveal the play of forces in which we are embedded. 
This play of forces is creative and hence also creates the agent. The 
poet is not subject to language, she is not in a reactive stance towards 
language, she exists even before this fi rst determination. In poetics, the 
17 My translation: ‘Das Machen der Kunst ist nicht Gegenstand des Wissens, 
weil das Machen der Kunst nicht im Wissen seinen Grund hat. Deshalb nennt die 
philosophische Ästhetik dieses Machen “dunkel” (Baumgarten): Das ästhetische 
Machen ist nicht eine selbstbewußte Handlung, denn es gibt kein ästhetisches 
Machen ohne das Wirken “unbewußter Kräfte” (Herder). Dieses Wirken ist Spiel: 
das Verbinden und Lösen und Neuverbinden und Wiederaufl ösen von Bildern in 
Akten der Einbildung’ (Menke 2013: 67).
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unconscious always plays a role, not in the sense that the originality 
or the genius of the poet lies within the psychoanalytic unconscious, 
but because ‘the world of which we can become conscious is only,’ as 
Nietzsche argues, ‘a surface- and sign-world, a world that is made com-
mon and meaner.’ (GS 354) The poet’s play with the unconscious is 
therefore a broadening of the scope of language and hence an expan-
sion of the world; it is an active force of transformation and creation.
We have seen that in the play of creative and destructive forces, the 
poet is a pre- and over-subjective agent who does not operate on the 
world of consciousness, but on that of the preconscious. In t erms of lan-
guage, the poet reveals the limits of linguistic conventions (illocution-
ary force) because they can never be fully determined. In other words, 
the poet arises as subject insofar as she brings the linguistic, social, 
and even poetic conventions into question. The notion of ‘subject’ is at 
the heart of Meschonnic’s and Kristeva’s conceptions of poetry and both 
reveal the importance of the transformative force(s) of poetry: transfor-
mation of language, of the subject, of society. In this sense, the force of 
poetry is a revolutionary one.
3. The revolution of poetry
We have seen that Nietzsche’s views of language bring force back into 
poetic language, and that Menke’s conception of art brings to the fore 
the idea that art is a creative and transformative force. It remains to be 
seen how this force operates in poetry, and I will focus on two theoreti-
cal works to do so, Meschonnic’s Celebration of Poetry and Kristeva’s 
Revolution in Poetic Language, and analyse one poem, Caroline Zekri’s 
‘Un pur rapport grammatical’. Both Meschonnic and Kristeva consider 
poetry to be a transformative force: poetry does not leave the subject 
(as reader or writer) unchanged. She undergoes a transformative proc-
ess due to a transformation of language. As Meschonnic clearly states: 
‘there is a poem only if a form of life transforms a form of language 
and if reciprocally a form of language transforms a form of life.’18 This 
double transformation of a form of life and a form of language—both 
being intimately related to one another—is precisely where the force of 
poetry operates. Because of this transformation of her form of life, the 
reader or writer cannot maintain the same attitude within and towards 
her surrounding world. In taking poetry seriously (unlike Austin’s re-
jection of poetic utterances in the realm of the ‘non-serious’), she must 
accept this transformation of her form of life.
What is central to Meschonnic’s views is the idea that poetry and 
life are intimately bound to one another. Against the views which argue 
that poetry is remote from the everyday politicised world—and hence 
remote from ordinary life—Meschonnic considers poetry and life to be 
18 My translation: ‘il y a un poème seulement si une forme de vie transforme une 
forme de langage et si réciproquement une forme de langage transforme une forme 
de vie’ (Meschonnic 2001: 292).
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closely related as the title of his book La rime et la vie makes it explicit. 
The poem must therefore not be understood in terms of work, i.e. in an 
essentialist way, but in terms of activity. The poem as a work of art is a 
working on changing the world and the subject through the transforma-
tion of language. Against the idea that poems have a truth, Meschonnic 
argues that they have an activity, an effect, a force. Wit h Meschonnic, 
we move from Austin’s notion of illocutionary force to something closer 
to Menke’s notion of force: poems have a force that build a subject rather 
than subject users to linguistic conventions. It is in this sense that po-
ems can be revolutionary. Against the idea that poetry, as a form of lit-
erature, can teach us facts about the world, poetry teaches us a different 
way of seeing the world and its revolutionary force resides precisely in 
its capacity to bring us to see things differently.
If we take seriously the idea that poems transform a form of lan-
guage and a form of life, thinking about poetry is not something which 
concerns only small details of our lives. Quite to the contrary as, ac-
cording to Meschonnic, ‘to think the poem, one must rethink the whole 
of language, and the whole relation between language, art, ethics, and 
politics.’19 Insofar as poetry transforms our form of language and our 
form of life, it has an ethical and political impact. For Meschonnic, 
thinking poetry requires rethinking language and, through this recon-
ceptualisation of language, rethinking our being in the world. If our 
ways of being in the world are dependent on our language, i.e. if our 
form of life is dependent on our form of language, and if a conception 
of language must account for poetry—because one can hardly argue 
that poetry is not related to language—we must modify our conceptions 
of language which fail to account for poetry and by changing those, 
change our ways of being in the world. In this sense, poetry becomes 
a topic of central philosophical signifi cance. Meschonnic brings to the 
fore the political, ethical, and foremost existential dimensions of po-
etry, insofar as language itself bears these political, ethical, and exis-
tential dimensions.
The ways in which poems can affect our ways of being in the world 
are multiple, but recent evolutions in poetry show that, against the 
romantic ideal of the poet in her ivory tower, the contemporary poet, 
following Baudelaire whose ‘halo slipped from [his] head, down onto 
the muddy street’ (Baudelaire 2008: 91), must be in the ‘muddy’ ev-
eryday world and act within it. Some poets operate this move from the 
tower to the ground by focusing on the quotidian and the everyday as 
poetic material. Kenneth Goldsmith’s transcription trilogy in which he 
transcribes weather reports (Weather, 2005), traffi c (Traffi c, 2007) or 
sports broadcast (Sports, 2008) participate in this idea of an ‘uncreative 
writing’ which casts a new light on everyday texts and situations. Fol-
19 My translation: ‘C’est pourquoi, pour penser la poésie, le poème, il y a à 
repenser tout le langage, et tout le rapport entre le langage, l’art, l’éthique et le 
politique’ (Meschonnic 2001: 256).
126 Ph. Mills, Doing Things with Words
lowing Moi’s title, they operate a Revolution of the Ordinary in which 
the ordinary is both the subject and the object of the revolution: the or-
dinary is the material for the revolution and is what becomes changed 
through the poetic work (Moi 2017).
Franck Leibovici’s work on poetic documents explores this trans-
formative force of poetry through the way poetry modifi es the use (and 
hence the meaning) of documents. Part of his analysis relies on Charles 
Reznikoff’s Testimony which, according to Leibovici, transforms court 
transcripts in such a way. In the process, the court transcripts lose 
their documentary quality and become what Franck Leibovici calls ‘po-
etic documents’ that overcome the categories of true and false. As he 
argues in discussing Reznikoff’s Testimony, the court transcripts are 
modifi ed insofar as they become fi ctional, not in the sense that they 
become false, but that revealing their linguistic nature ‘automatically 
suspends the categories of truth and false.’20 What is central is not that 
these documents become poetic, but the realization that any document 
has the potential to become poetic and hence that the categories of 
‘document’ and of ‘poetry’ are to be reassessed.21 This reassessment of 
categories entail, as Meschonnic suggests, a rethinking of politics and 
ethics through the reconceptualization of language and art. Kenneth 
Goldsmith even considers that the simple reproduction of a text has 
sometimes more impact than a ‘creative’ poetic production: ‘Sometimes, 
by the noninterventionist reproduction of texts, we can shed light on 
political issues in a more profound and illuminating way than we can 
by conventional critique’ (Goldsmith 2011: 84). Such ‘poetic documents’ 
reveal the fact that poetry has the force to modify a form of language 
and hence a form of life, but also, following Meschonnic, that a form of 
life transforms a form of language. Poetry does not come out unchanged 
from its encounter with documents, quite to the contrary. It is crucial 
to note that according to Leibovici ‘poetic documents’ are not static, are 
not to be considered fi xed entities as works of art, but are processes 
that can always evolve: ‘the output, through the successive redescrip-
tions, has gained a strong analytic power: at the same time process 
and product, small machine to redscribe and output of a redescription, 
it can be applied to some situations, working as a transportable poetic 
document, as if dematerialized’ (Leibovici 2007: 68). Against the es-
sentialization of the work of art, poetic documents are workings of art, 
they act upon the world by acting upon language. The apparent oxy-
moron ‘poetic documents’ reveals that the quotidian world affect poetry 
and that, in turn, poetry affects the quotidian world.
By affecting the quotidian world, poetic documents are not only con-
20 ‘par fi ction, nous n’entendons pas quelque chose relevant de l’imaginaire, 
du “forgé de toutes pièces,” mais simplement quelque chose exhibant sa nature 
langagière, suspendant ainsi automatiquement les catégories de vrai ou de faux 
(critères de vérité)’ (Leibovici 2007: 35).
21 Gaëlle Théval suggests that these poetic practices resemble readymades in art 
(Théval 2015).
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ceptual devices (as the term conceptual poetry describing Goldsmith’s 
work might suggest) but can also aspire to having a transformative and 
even political impact. An example of such a poetic document with po-
litical aspirations is Zekri’s ‘Un pur rapport grammatical’ which com-
bines excerpts from the ‘Report of the Mapping Exercise’22 from the 
Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), analys-
ing violence in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between 1993 
and 2003, and excerpts from individual evaluation forms from the ‘Per-
manence d’accueil et d’orientation des mineurs isolés étrangers à Paris 
(PAOMIE)’ (Zekri 2015: 16), showing how French authorities evaluate 
under 18 migrants in Paris. The confrontation and reconfi guration of 
these documents reveal a certain use of language that the poetic docu-
ment aims to disrupt. Zekri distinguishes both sources by using short 
quotations organised as verses from the Report and longer sentences 
from the evaluation forms. This distinction generates a contrast be-
tween a form of emotional violence in shorter verses and a form of rejec-
tion of emotion in longer sentences. There is something of a distinction 
between a more poetic structure on the one hand and a more narrative 
or argumentative structure on the other.
Here are the fi rst lines of Zekri’s poem:
on the pretext of searching their genitals for minerals
including diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, cassiterite (tin ore) and 
coltan
are alleged to have mutilated and disembowelled a pregnant woman
stripped, manhandled and even severely beaten with nail-studded 
pieces of wood
for having worn trousers
and 17% of global production of rough diamonds
and two girls aged six and seven
When asked about his older sisters’ age, he begins counting out 
loud. It is diffi cult to believe that he doesn’t know his older sisters’ 
age. He says he can’t explain.23
22 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_
FINAL_EN.pdf
23 (Zekri 2015: 7) I used the translation from the report to translate the parts 
taken from there and translated myself the sentences taken from the evaluation 
cards:
sous prétexte de chercher des minerais dans leur parties génitales
dont les diamants, l’or, le cuivre, le cobalt, la cassitérite et le coltan
auraient mutilé et éventré une femme enceinte
dénudées, molestées et battues sévèrement avec des planches cloutées
pour avoir porté un pantalon
et 17% de la production mondiale de diamants bruts
ainsi que deux fi llettes de 6 et 7 ans
Lorsqu’on lui demande l’âge de ses sœurs aînées, il commence à calculer à voix 
haute. Il est diffi cilement crédible qu’il ne sache pas l’âge de ses sœurs aînées. 
Il dit qu’il ne peut expliquer.
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To understand the fi rst lines of the poem, it is necessary to explain the 
title ‘Un pur rapport grammatical’ as it plays on (at least) three pos-
sible meanings of rapport in French.
1. The obvious meaning when we know the source of these sentenc-
es, rapport means report. That it is a grammatical report might 
mean that Zerki’s poem focuses on the linguistic aspect of the 
report and plays with it. Indeed, except for the ‘and’ in verse 6, 
all these sentences can be found in the report from the OHCHR 
and the addition of ‘and’ is a grammatical one establishing a 
grammatical relation (this notion relation will be of importance 
in the third line of interpretation) between the two verses. We 
can understand that the reorganisation of the report operates 
on grammatical grounds. If we focus on the grammar of the sen-
tence, two elements stand out.
 First, in verse 3, the subject of the verb ‘are’ must grammati-
cally be ‘diamonds, gold, copper, etc.’ from verse 2, which sug-
gests that the violence is operated by the minerals themselves 
and, by metonymy, by the mining industry, something which is 
epitomised in the last two verses of the poem: ‘some had their 
anuses ripped with a knife/ by multinationals’ (Zekri 2015: 15). 
In this last verse, Zekri adds ‘by’ to generate once again a gram-
matical relation in a way similar to verse 6. The same play with 
grammar can be seen in verse 4 as the feminine plural of the 
adjectives (‘stripped,’ ‘manhandled,’ ‘beaten’) can only refer to 
genitals in verse 1, thus bringing the attention to the woman-
hood of the victims.
 Second, in verses 5, 6, and 7, Zekri uses a zeugma to join three 
objects by using one verb, playing with three meanings of porter: 
1. to wear trousers, 2. to carry diamonds (that relates to the fi rst 
verse where minerals are hidden in genitals), 3. to carry a child 
(as in being pregnant). This zeugma therefore gives three rea-
sons to explain the violence in verse 4 and places these reasons 
on a same level, considering them of equal importance.
2. Rapport means ratio. Although the idea of a grammatical ratio 
might be somewhat strange, the use of percentages in the report 
and the poem brings this aspect to the fore. The poem brings the 
reader’s attention to the use of percentages and the depersonali-
sation that they operate. People become numbers, ratio, rather 
than victims. Furthermore, there is a relation between the im-
portance of statistics in economy, in the mining industry in this 
case, and in the evaluation of the damages of the industry. The 
word ‘ratio’ therefore becomes a grammatical connector between 
the industry and its damages.
3. Rapport means relation. As already mentioned in point 1, the 
notion of relation is crucial. The poetic document establishes 
grammatical relations between aspects that are not necessar-
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ily so connected. Furthermore, the poetic document establishes 
a relation between the report and the evaluation forms, which 
has at least two effects. First, these evaluation forms show how 
people in Paris are evaluating migrants from their perspective 
without considering the effects of the violence that they have 
been through, hence the repetition of ‘diffi cult to believe’ in many 
of the excerpts.24 Second, it establishes a relation between what 
has happened in the DRC and what happens in Paris: multina-
tionals can go to DRC and commit violence, but migrants cannot 
come to Paris and have a supposedly incoherent story.
Zekri’s poem therefore shows how poetry transforms an ordinary form 
of language (report and evaluation forms) and reveals something 
through this transformation. There is, if not a direct political claim, an 
injunction to discover and uncover relations (rapport) that operate in 
language. In this sense, I believe we can extend the conception of docu-
ment even to some forms of poetry that do not use ready-made texts. 
Insofar as poetry uses language, and if there is an attention to the lan-
guage used, i.e. if there is a linguistic or metapoetic dimension to the 
poem, all poems can to some extent be documentary. 25 If we consider 
that the language of poetry is not ontologically distinct from ordinary 
language, ordinary language becomes the document that the poetic 
phenomenon disrupts and transforms. It is in this sense that there is 
a Revolution of the Ordinary following Moi or, following Kristeva, a 
Revolution in Poetic Language.
Kristeva’s title can be understood in two different ways, depending 
on the interpretation of the ‘in’. First, it can be interpreted as a revolu-
tion occurring within the realm of poetic language and a large part of 
her work indeed investigates the changes that occur within the lan-
guage of French poetry at the end of the 19th century. But this interpre-
tation remains within the framework according to which there is such 
a thing as ‘poetic language’, even though it is subject to changes and 
revolution. Second, from a broader perspective, it can be interpreted as 
a revolution operated by poetic language. The revolution is not occur-
ring within poetic language but is caused by poetic language. According 
to this second interpretation, poetry becomes a revolutionary force.
24 ‘diffi cile à croire’ (p. 8), ‘diffi cilement crédible’ (p. 9), ‘peu de crédibilité’ (p. 11), 
‘peu crédible’ (p. 12), ‘peu crédible’ (p. 14).
25 This is especially true of a certain trend in contemporary French poetry, 
inspired by the American Objectivists among others, that takes the ordinary, the 
quotidian, the everyday as material for poetic explorations. In their anthology on 
Contemporary French poetry, Writing the Real, Nina Parish and Emma Wagstaff 
explore this ‘refi guration of the everyday’ among other trends (Parish and Wagstaff 
2016). The quotidian has been of central importance in 20th century French poetry 
(Sheringham 2006), and this importance continues nowadays, especially in the 
journal Nioques and at the publisher ‘Questions théoriques’.
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We have seen with Meschonnic that poetry investigates the relation 
between forms of language and forms of life. It is precisely through 
this investigation that Kristeva considers poetry to be a revolutionary 
force: ‘But mimesis and poetic language do more than engage in an 
intra-ideological debate; they question the very principle of the ideolog-
ical because they unfold the unicity of the thetic (the precondition for 
meaning and signifi cation) and prevent its theologization.’ (Kristeva 
1984: 61). Insofar as poetic truth is a way into the understanding of the 
relation between language and the world, and the constitution of this 
relation, it is not external to ideological, social, and political debates, 
but at their very heart. Poetic language is a space for transgression in 
which the foundations of the ordinary norm are fundamentally brought 
into question. Kristeva uses the term ‘theology’ to describe this relation 
to a given that is never put into question, which relates to Nietzsche’s 
claim in Twilight of the Idols26: ‘I’m afraid we are not rid of God because 
we still believe in grammar…’ (TI ‘Reason’ 5).
Against the traditional view that posits poetic language as distinct 
from the ordinary, Kristeva considers it to lie at its very heart and to 
question the prejudices embedded in our uses of language. As an enemy 
within, poetic language becomes a revolutionary force. Indeed, whereas 
positing poetic language as outside only weakens its force, making it 
an external other which can easily be rejected, considering poetic lan-
guage as lying at the heart of the ordinary gives it a force of changing 
things from within. For Kristeva, poetry affects language in such ways 
that our conceptions of the world cannot remain unchanged.
In order to conceptualise how poetry operates such a change, Kris-
teva elaborates the notion of practice and, as we have seen with Me-
schonnic, a poem is not a work but a working, an activity, a practice:
The text thereby attains its essential dimension: it is a practice calling into 
question (symbolic and social) fi nitudes by proposing new signifying devices. 
In calling the text a practice we must not forget that it is a new practice, 
radically different from the mechanistic practice of a null and void, atom-
istic subject who refuses to acknowledge that he is a subject of language. 
Against such a ‘practice,’ the text as signifying practice points toward the 
possibility—which is a jouissance—of a subject who speaks his being put 
in process/on trial through action. In other words and conversely, the text 
restores to ‘mute’ practice the jouissance that constitutes it but which can 
only become jouissance through language. (Kristeva 1984: 210)
Kristeva’s substitution of ‘poem’ by ‘text’ broadens the scope of what 
poetry is and can do. Shifting from poem to text undercuts all formal 
defi nitions of poetry and moves towards the notion of practice. Whereas 
the notion of poem remain within the framework of mechanistic prac-
tice—there are rules defi ning what a poem is and, in this sense, a poet-
ics is a set of rules for literary creation27—Kristeva considers the prac-
26 (Nietzsche 2008) Hereafter TI.
27 Such a conception of poetics is at the heart of Aristotle’s Poetics in which he 
famously gives the rules to evaluate a good tragedy. In this context, poetics is a way 
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tice of the text to be a revolutionary one ‘calling into question (symbolic 
and social) fi nitudes.’ There is a social aspect to textual practice insofar 
as the text operates a critical force attempting to overcome established 
social rules. However, like Nietzsche and Menke, Kristeva considers 
this critical aspect to be only one side of practice. Indeed, following 
Nietzsche’s idea that we can destroy only as creators, the criticism of 
fi nitudes occurs only through the ‘proposing [of] new signifying devices.’ 
The text is therefore not only a place of criticism against established 
social values, but also a place of creation of new means of signifi cation. 
The text therefore becomes a signifying practice in which the subject 
comes to jouissance, to living language in a positive way. The focus on 
the notions of text and practice leads Kristeva to consider poetry as 
combining two forces in language: a destructive and a creative one. It 
is only in combining these two forces that poetry can be revolutionary. 
If it focused only on the critical side, it would remain forceless because 
criticising language by using language is a self-contradiction. However, 
focusing on the creative side of language allows to propose new signify-
ing practices which replace the old ways of thinking, hence destroying 
as creators.
Both Meschonnic and Kristeva bring our attention on the fact that 
poetry is revolutionary insofar as it is a practice aiming at modifying our 
ways of being in the world through the modifi cation of language. Against 
the essentialisation of poems as works of art, their views consider nec-
essary to approach poems as workings of art, as doing something to 
language and to the subject (as reader and writer), thus relating to Lei-
bovici’s idea that poetic documents are processes rather than fi xed and 
stable entities. The force of poetry lies in this doing. Poetry therefore 
teaches us about the creative potential that lies within all forms of lan-
guage. Whereas considering poetic language as essentially distinct from 
ordinary language makes poetic language forceless, bringing the poetic 
back within the ordinary reveals the creatives capacities of language, 
the transformative and revolutionary forces that animate our uses of 
of classifying and evaluating artworks in respect to their relation to representation 
or mimesis: ‘Now epic poetry and the making of tragedy, and also comedy and 
dithyrambic poetry, as well as most fl ue-playing and lyre-playing, are all as a whole 
just exactly imitations, but they are different from one another in three ways, 
for they differ either by making their imitations in different things, by imitating 
different things, or by imitating differently and not in the same way’ (Aristotle 2006: 
19). Jacques Rancière describes such a poetics as the poetic regime of art: ‘I call this 
regime poetic in the sense that it identifi es the arts—what the Classical Age would 
later call the ‘fi ne arts’—within a classifi cation of ways of doing and making, and it 
consequently defi nes proper ways of doing and making as well as means of assessing 
imitations’ (Rancière 2004: 17). Against this poetic regime, Rancière consider the 
aesthetic regime which moves away from the Aristotelian classifi cation in terms 
of representation towards an identifi cation of art in its singularity. Kristeva’s shift 
from poem to text is an attempt to move from the poetic regime (where the poem is 
classifi ed as a poem) to the aesthetic regime (where the text exists in its singularity 
without any presupposed classifi cation).
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language. A philosophy of language that overlooks this creative force 
cannot account for the enormous potential that lies at the heart of lan-
guage. Such a philosophy of language would be, as Kristeva argues at 
the very beginning of Revolution in Poetic language, ‘nothing more than 
the thoughts of archivists, archaeologists, and necrophiliacs’ (Kristeva 
1984: 13). If the force of poetry is a revolutionary one, then, in respect 
to philosophy of language, poetry forces philosophy to operate such a 
revolution in order to account for the creative uses of language that are 
present in our everyday life. If, as Meschonnic argues, poetry does some-
thing to language, it also does something to philosophy of language: it 
reveals the shortcomings of conceptions of language and the necessity 
for any serious philosophy of language to account for poetic phenomena. 
The force of poetry therefore brings philosophy to rethink its categories 
(language, truth, fi ction, ordinary) while modifying our ways of being 
in and of affecting the world. By doing things to words, poetry affects 
our conceptual scheme and our forms of life. If, following Austin, poetry 
cannot teach us how to do things with words because it cannot be taken 
seriously, it reveals us how to do things to words and, through this do-
ing, how to transform and affect the world.
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